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COMMENT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MEDIATION PANELS:
A MARYLAND PERSPECTIVEt
The recent rapid rise in medical malpractice insurance rates
has engendered a proliferationof state activity designed to
cope with the problem. This Comment analyzes the
Constitutional challenges made to the medical malpractice
mediation panels adopted by various state legislatures. The
author concludes, in light of the decision in Attorney
General v. Johnson upholding the somewhat unique
Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, that it is
likely that most such plans could withstand Constitutional
attack.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The medical malpractice crisis (actually a malpractice insurance
crisis) produced extensive legislative reform across the country in
1975-1976.1 This legislation was designed to counteract rapidly
rising insurance rates and to ensure adequate insurance coverage for
medical personnel and facilities. 2 One promising legislative solution
is an extrajudicial dispute resolution mechanism known as "mediation." Mediation provides an inexpensive, speedy alternative to
traditional litigation.

t The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Stephen R. Cochell, a
former member of the University of Baltimore Law Review staff and a 1979
graduate of the School of Law, for his research and preparation of an initial
draft of this Comment..
1. To date all states have enacted legislation designed to deal with some aspect of
the crisis. Of the twenty-six mediation panel statutes thus far enacted, all but
five took effect in 1975 or 1976. See note 3 infra. Some commentators have
suggested that the crisis was contrived. See, e.g., Lambert, Family Law, 36
ATLA JOURNAL, 230, 255 (1976).
2. Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 322 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mediation Panels]. Between
1960 and 1970, for example, rates for surgeons rose 950%. Non-surgical
physicians faced increases of 540%, and hospital premiums rose 262%. U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-88, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13 (1973). The
situation became even more grave during the early 1970's. In some states
physicians' insurance rates rose more than 100% in a single year. Redish,

Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 760 n.3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Redish].
Some doctors were faced with the possibility that malpractice coverage would be
completely unavailable. New York's principal insurer withdrew malpractice
coverage in July 1975, and was replaced by Argonaut Insurance Company,
which increased malpractice rates by 93.5%. After announcing a further increase
of 196.8% in January 1975, Argonaut withdrew from the market on July 1, 1975.
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Currently, statutory mediation panels are in effect in twenty-six
states.3 Although the provisions of these state statutes vary widely,
all are subject to attack on the following constitutional grounds: (1)
separation of powers; (2) equal protection; and (3) due process and
the right to trial by jury. 4 State courts are split on whether mediation
panels are constitutional, and cannot agree on which standards are
proper for testing them. The Maryland plan5 was recently subjected
to constitutional attack in Attorney General v. Johnson,6 and was
upheld by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Because the Maryland
mediation panel has the most far-reaching powers of any such panel
in the country,7 the decision should serve as a benchmark to courts
yet to determine the constitutionality of their states' mediation
panels.
This Comment examines the features of mediation panels across
the country, and analyzes the most important constitutional challenges to medical malpractice mediation. The Maryland plan is
Note, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels - A Constitutional
Examination, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 416, 416 n.2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Malpractice Mediation] (citing STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

13-21 (1976)).

In 1974, Maryland's major malpractice insurance carrier announced its
withdrawal from the market. The state legislature responded to the immediate
crisis by creating the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society to fill the gap.
Law of April 29, 1975, ch. 544, 1975 Md. Laws 2604 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, §§ 548-556 (1979)). More extensive reform, however, was needed. To that
end, a special task force was created, which recommended mandatory arbitration
for all claims exceeding $5,000 as a precondition to court action. The legislature
responded by passing an act concerning "Health Care Malpractice Claims." Law
of May 4, 1976, ch. 235, 1976 Md. Laws 495 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to 3-2A-09 (Supp. 1979)).
3. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.535-536 (Supp. 1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567
(Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2602 to -2612 (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18 §§ 6803-6814 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (West Supp. 1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-11 (Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1001 to- 1013 (1979);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to .5-9-10 (Burns Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§8 65-4901 to -4908 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1977);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 2801-2809 (Supp. 1978); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to 3-2A-09 (Supp. 1979); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§538.010 to .080 (Vernon

Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 17-1301 to -1315 (Supp. 1977);
REV. STAT. §§ 44-2840 to -2847 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A (1975); N.H.

ANN. §§519-A:1 to -A:10 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-5-1 to -5-28
(1978); N.Y. JUD. LAw §148-a (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§32-29.1-01 to .1-10 (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§1301.301 to -. 306
(Purdon Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to -19- 10 (Supp. 1978); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-3401 to -3421 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.12:2
(1977 & Supp. 1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02 to .21 (West Spec. Pamphlet 1979).
See Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 583 (1977).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-2A-01 to 3-2A-09 (Supp. 1979).
282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
No statute other than Maryland's cloaks a panel's findings with a presumption
of correctness at the trial de novo. Compare Massachusetts, which is the only
state that requires a plaintiff to post a bond before proceeding to trial. MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 231, §60B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978). But see Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 587, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (bond requirement held
unconstitutional as a burden on access to courts).
STAT.

4.

5.
6.
7.

NEB.
REV.
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emphasized because of its uniqueness in the field of extra-judicial
dispute resolution.
II.BACKGROUND
A state has two broad solutions available when faced with
rapidly rising malpractice insurance rates. First, the total amount
paid out in settlements can be lowered" either by reducing the
number of plaintiffs entitled to bring claims 9 or by limiting the
amount recoverable on those claims. 10 This should reduce strain on
insurance carriers, resulting in more readily available malpractice
insurance and lower premiums. Second, a state can reform the
dispute resolution mechanism"l in an attempt to provide faster, less
expensive methods of deciding medical malpractice claims. This, too,
should lessen the burden on insurance companies, with a concomi12
tant drop in malpractice insurance premiums.
The first alternative, manipulation of the remedy, indiscriminately affects meritorious as well as frivolous claims. 13 Because

8. These solutions are characterized by one commentator as tort law modifications.
For a discussion of these modifications and others beyond the scope of this
comment see Abraham, Medical MalpracticeReform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36
MD. L. REV. 489 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Abraham].
9. For example, the statute of limitations can be shortened so that fewer claims are
filed. The longer the relevant statute of limitations, the longer the period of risk
for the insurance company. Insurance companies refer to this period of risk as
the "long tail." A related doctrine, the discovery rule, provides that the statute
does not begin to run until the victim discovers or should have discovered his
injury. This rule lengthens the period of liability for both the health care provider
and his insurance carrier. Some states have modified the discovery rule. See, e.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9) (West Supp. 1979) (six year limit with exception for
foreign objects left in patient's body). Another doctrine, establishing a special
disability period for minors, tolls the statute of limitations until a minor reaches
the age of majority. Until this time he is considered unable to protect his
interests. Young children in some states can retain viable claims for periods
greatly in excess of the traditional period. Concern for the "long tail" has led
some states to modify or reject this doctrine. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1
(Burns Supp. 1979) (minors under six excepted). See generally Redish, supra note
2, at 765-66.
10. For example, under the Indiana plan, a plaintiff's total recovery in a malpractice
case may not exceed $500,000. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to .5-9-10 (Burns
Supp. 1979). Another possibility is to abrogate or eliminate the collateral source
rule, which precludes the jury from considering the compensation received by a
plaintiff from outside health insurance policies when it assesses the damages to
be paid by defendant. See generally Redish, supra note 2, at 764.
11. See text accompanying note 14 infra.
12. Malpractice cases, because of their complexity and the possibility of extremely
high awards, are expensive to defend. It must also be recognized that because of
the great expense of trying lawsuits, some plaintiffs file nuisance suits hoping to
reach quick settlement, realizing that insurance companies are often willing to
settle rather than go through the expense of trial. See Documentary Supplement,
Medical-Legal Screening Panels As An Alternative Approach to Medical
Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 695, 709 (1972).
13. For example, a legitimate claim for $1,000,000 would be limited to a recovery of
$500,000 in Indiana. See note 10 supra.
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medical malpractice may result in serious injury, this approach is
not recommended. A more sophisticated solution is the second
possibility, which treats all claims equally but seeks early disposal
of cases that are not well based in fact and law. Medical review
boards, 14 screening panels, and arbitration have been explored as
alternatives to often cumbersome judicial trials.
The terms "screening panels" and "arbitration" are often
confused. The distinction between the two, however, is important.
Arbitration boards provide final, binding determinations and are an
actual substitute for trial. 15 Screening panel determinations are
purely advisory and intended to educate the parties as to the merits
of a case. 16 Such decisions are not intended to be binding or
admissible as evidence in further proceedings. Although Maryland
describes its system as an "Arbitration Panel," 17 the service
provided by the panel is not arbitration. Decisions of the panel are
neither final nor binding,18 the earmarks of true arbitration. Nor is
the Maryland plan best described as a screening panel. The
Maryland plan, which clothes the decision of the panel with a
presumption of correctness, 19 is a hybrid that incorporates features
of both screening panels and arbitration. The procedure is relatively
inexpensive, informal, and provides a speedy decision. Proceedings
take place in private, allowing for minimal damage to the
physician's career. At the same time, the merits of the case are
considered by a panel that has some expertise in the field. The
recommendations of that panel, while not binding, provide strong
incentive for settlement before trial because of the parties' awareness
that the panel's finding will be considered by the jury. Several
commentators suggest that this type of system be called "mediation,"20 and it shall be referred to herein as such.

14. Medical review boards are advisory panels designed to give peer group review of

15.

16.

17.

18.
19.
20.

medical performance. The findings of these boards are not useful for litigation
purposes, except to provide the doctor with some idea of the merits of the claim
against him. Because they are not adversary proceedings, review boards are
outside the scope of this Comment.
For purposes of this Comment, "arbitration" means a non-judicial mechanism
that renders binding decisions. Many states provide for voluntary arbitration
plans either as the sole alternative to court action or in conjunction with other
non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms. E.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1974). At least thirty-five states have adopted arbitration
statutes of some form. D. DOBBs, REMEDIES 937-38 (1973).
Screening panels are similar to review boards, except that they are adversary
proceedings. Screening panels allow both parties to present evidence, and render
an opinion based upon the legal merits of the case. Their purpose is to discourage
parties from bringing frivolous or non-meritorious claims to court, not to provide
evidence for trial.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01(b) (Supp. 1979).
A party may reject an award for any reason by serving notice on the other party
and filing an action to nullify the award. Id. §3-2A-06(a) (Supp. 1979).
Id. §3-2A-06(d) (Supp. 1979).
See, e.g., Mediation Panels supra note 2; Malpractice Mediation, supra note 2.
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Certain characteristics are common to most mediation panel
systems. The majority, including the Maryland plan, require
mediation as a prerequisite to trial. 21 Several states require that
panels be used only upon the exercise of the discretion of the trial
provide decisions that
judge. 22 A few systems are voluntary and
23
equal in effect those of screening panels.
24
In some states the panels make decisions only as to liability;
other states allow panels to make a finding of damages as well.m
The weakness in the policy of the former states is that a major
feature of the case, damages, is left undecided. 26 Those panels
providing only liability findings do not supply the parties with a
sufficient basis for deciding whether to settle or proceed to trial. The
problem with settling many malpractice cases is not determining
liability, but arriving at a mutually acceptable measure of damages.
Because the avowed purpose of mediation panels is to encourage
settlement, they must provide the parties with an accurate and
complete opinion of the merits of a claim.
The composition of mediation panels varies from state to state.
Typically, as in Maryland, a physician, an attorney, and a layperson
serve on each panel. The physician provides medical expertise on the
merits of the claim, the attorney evaluates the legal consequences,
and the layman serves as the "conscience" of the panel. 27 In essence,
28
the panel can be likened to a smaller, more sophisticated jury.
Questions have been raised as to the propriety of including
physicians on panels. 29 To date, however, the need for expert opinion

21. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04 (Supp. 1979). Some states

22.

23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

require mediation as a prerequisite to the filing of the complaint. In Maryland,
for example, the complaint is filed directly with the Director of the Health Claims
Arbitration Office. Id. Other states permit the complaint to be filed in court, but
require mediation before the commencement of trial. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 10-19-2 (Supp. 1978).
E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4901 (Supp. 1978).
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34- 2602 to -2612 (Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24
§§ 2801-2809 (Supp. 1978).
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-567G (Supp. 1979).
See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(d) (Supp. 1979). In some
states, panels are permitted to assess punitive damages. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.603 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Defense lawyers criticize panels that do
not provide a finding of damages. They claim "they are forced to disclose their
defense with no guarantee that the claim will be dropped if the panel finds in
their favor, and if the plaintiff wins at the panel stage he can hold out for a
larger settlement." Roth, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Its Causes,
The Effects, And Proposed Solutions, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 469, 497 (1977.).
Abraham, supra note 8, at 514.
Id.
Mediation Panels, supra note 2, at 326.
Ninety per cent of Maryland's doctors are insured by the same carrier, the
Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland. The fear is that doctors
will oppose damage awards because of the possible effect on their own insurance
rates.
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and reliance on physicians' professional integrity have overcome
opposition. :"
The impact of the panels' decisions varies widely. A majority of
states allow the decision of the panel into evidence at subsequent
court proceedings. : 1 Nearly all of these states allow the jury to
determine the weight to be attached to the finding of the panel .32 The
sole exception is Maryland, which provides that the panel decision is
presumptively correct. 33 Statutes that do not provide for admissibility of the panel's decision 3 4 vitiate the entire process. Far from being
encouraged to settle, the parties may go through mediation
unprepared and uncaring, knowing that the result means little or
nothing. Inadmissible panel findings are merely advisory and can
be readily ignored by either party.
The Maryland plan derives a higher margin of utility from the
deliberation of its panels. The parties are prodded into maximizing
their efforts before the mediation panel by the knowledge that the
panel's decision carries enough weight to direct a verdict at the trial
de novo. The Maryland plan, with its presumption, encroaches
further on the constitutional rights of the parties than the plan of
any other state. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by upholding the
Maryland plan and the presumption, paved the way for more
powerful mediation panels across the country.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The doctrine of separation of powers parcels out and separates
the authority of state government among the executive, legislative
and judicial branches.3 Each department within its own sphere is
independent of the others, and each performs duties that are not
subject to the control of the others. No department may exercise the
30. Every plan in effect today includes doctors or other health care providers in the
decision making process.
31. Some states admit the liability finding only. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAw § 148-a(8)
(McKinney Supp. 1978). Other plans, including Maryland's, allow the finding as
to damages to be admitted as well. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-2A-05(d) (Supp. 1979). Mandatory plans that allow damage awards to be
admitted into evidence are relatively rare. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.19(1)
(West Spec. Pamphlet 1979) (damage findings admissible at court's discretion).
32. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-567M (Supp. 1979). Juries probably consider
panel findings as equivalent to expert testimony. A few states require jury
instructions to that effect. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §09.55.536(e) (Supp. 1979)
(requiring jury instruction that the panel report be considered and evaluated in
the same manner as any other expert testimony).
33. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
accompanying notes 113-20 infra.

§3-2A-06(d) (Supp. 1979). See text

34. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §538.050 (Vernon Supp. 1979) (no mention of, or
reference to, any recommendation of the review board may be made at trial);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-1312(4) (Supp. 1977) (report of panel not admissible
in any subsequent action).
35. See text accompanying notes 116-19 infra.
36. Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 62, 217 A.2d 578, 582 (1966).
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powers properly belonging to the other departments. In the context
of mediation panel legislation the issue is whether the panels usurp
judicial power in violation of separation of power principles.
In Maryland, the Health Claims Arbitration Office is expressly
recognized as a unit of the executive branch.3 7 This poses questions
that do not arise in other jurisdictions. In Massachusetts, for
example, mediation panels are considered to be part of the judicial
branch. 38 In such a case no separation of powers problem exists,
because judicial power is clearly retained within its proper department. In jurisdictions such as Maryland, where the mediation
function is not part of the judicial branch, the panels are subject to
challenge on the basis that judicial power has been improperly
delegated to a coordinate branch of the government.
The important question is whether the power exercised by
mediation panels is judicial. If so, the mediation plans violate state
constitutional provisions vesting judicial power exclusively in the
courts. 39 If the power exercised by the panels is not judicial power,
the constitutional prohibitions do not apply.4 0 What, then, is the

37. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-2A-03(a) (Supp. 1979).
38. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Mass. 1977). The vast majority of
jurisdictions place the panels under the judicial branch. Most states place
administration of the mediation process under a judicial officer or clerk of the
court. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAw. § 148-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
39. MD. CONsT. art. 4, § 1 provides as follows:
The Judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Court of Appeals,
and such intermediate courts of appeal, as shall be provided by law by
the General Assembly, Circuit Courts, Orphan's Courts, such Courts for
the City of Baltimore, as are hereinafter provided for, and a District
Court; all said Courts shall be Courts of Record, and each shall have a
seal to be used in the authentication of all process issuing therefrom.
40. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8 provides "[t]hat the Legislative, Executive
and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct
from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said
Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." This provision
gave rise to the contention that the Act vests judicial power in an administrative
agency, allowing an arm of the executive branch to discharge the duties of the
judiciary. The court of appeals in Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385
A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), went to some length to determine
that the body exercising power - the arbitration panel - is not an
administrative agency. Id. at 285-86, 385 A.2d at 63-64. The administrative
agency created by the Act is a "unit in the Executive Department" called the
Health Claims Arbitration Office. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03
(Supp. 1979). The court distinguished the panels from the Arbitration Office,
finding the nexus between the office and the panels insufficient to place the
panels within the function of the office, and thus within the executive branch.
282 Md. at 286, 385 A.2d at 64.
The court did not explain where the unmoored arbitration panels belong in
the scheme of Maryland government, but it was emphatic in removing them
from the executive. Because the panels have no executive function, they may
exercise judicial power with impunity so far as article eight of the Declaration of
Rights is concerned. That article merely prohibits one body from exercising the
functions of two branches.
This analysis is strained and unsupported by authority. To separate the
panels, which make the awards, from the Arbitration Office, which provides all
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essence of judicial power? The Court of Appeals of Maryland
provides the most complete answer of any court yet to consider the
question in this context.
41
The court began its analysis in Attorney General v. Johnson'42
by avoiding "the erroneous notion that all adjudication is judicial.
"Adjudication" is the process of fact-finding and the application of
legal principles to those facts - a process characterized as quasijudicial. 4 3 It has long been recognized in Maryland that the proper
exercise of quasi-judicial power by an administrative agency is
44
constitutionally permissible.

41.
42.
43.

44.

logistical support, makes too nice a distinction. Furthermore, the argument is
merely a makeweight, because the court went on to find that the power delegated
is not judicial. The identity of the body to which judicial power is not granted is
of no consequence. If the panels do not exercise judicial power, the court's
analysis isolating them from the executive branch in order to avoid the
separation of powers provisions of article eight of the Declaration of Rights was
unnecessary.
282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
Id. at 284, 385 A.2d at 63 (citing Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 2 N.J. 356, 364, 66 A.2d 726, 730 (1949)).
Dal Maso v. County Comm'rs, 182 Md. 200, 205, 34 A.2d 464, 466 (1943). The term
"quasi-judicial" is imprecise; "adjudicatory" function is recommended. Justice
Jackson noted his views on administrative agencies and their labels:
They [administrative bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch
of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories
much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-"
dimensional thinking.
Courts have differed in assigning a place to these seemingly
necessary bodies in our constitutional system. Administrative agencies
have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as
the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the
separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the
qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized
classifications have broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which
we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a
disordered bed.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 429-32, 312 A.2d 225,
239-41 (1973) (upholding Montgomery County Commission on Landlord Tenant
Affairs). The case tied the exercise of adjudicatory power to the proper exercise of
regulatory powers, stating, "[T]he Commissions function is not primarily to
decide questions of legal rights between private parties, but [that function] is
merely incidental, although reasonably necessary, to its regulatory powers." 270
Md. at 441, 312 A.2d at 245-46.
For an explanation of the relationship between regulatory and adjudicatory
powers, see Tomlinson, ConstitutionalLimits on the DecisionalPowers of Courts
and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD.L. REv. 414, 449-55 (1976);
Maryland Racing Comm'n v. McGee, 212 Md. 69, 80, 128 A.2d 419, 425 (1957)
(validating Maryland Racing Commission's power to suspend a trainer's license
when the trainer violates a Commission rule); Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372,
278-79, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945) (upholding the authority of retirement boards to
make decisions on pension rights); Dal Maso v. County Comm'rs, 182 Md. 200,
205, 34 A.2d 464, 466 (1943) (upholding the authority of zoning boards to make
zoning determinations); Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 284, 101 A.
710, 716 (1917) (Maryland's Workmen's Compensation Act held constitutional).
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Having noted that the determination of facts and the application of legal principles to those facts do not necessarily constitute an
exercise of judicial power, the court went on to ascertain the qualities
that "imbue such determinations with judicial power." 45 The court
held that implicit in Maryland's case law is the principle that "the
essence of judicial power is the final authority to render and enforce
a judgment. 46 The court noted with approval the rule articulated in
an earlier Maryland case: "It is not enough to make a function
judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought and
judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within
the subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the
judiciary . . . . 47 The court of appeals interpreted this rule to mean
that a decision constitutes an exercise of judicial power only
when it
4
is binding and enforceable by the entity that rendered it. 8
The decisions of mediation panels are neither binding on the
parties nor enforceable by the panels. In Maryland, either party may9
4
reject the panel's decision for any reason or for no reason at all.

Even if the decision is not rejected, the panel must look to the courts
to enforce the award. 50 Thus, because mediation panels lack the
essential power to render binding enforceable decisions, their
function is merely adjudicatory and does not involve an exercise of
judicial power.
Other courts considering the separation of powers issue have
reached the same conclusion. In Nebraska, the function of the panel
is characterized as a pretrial settlement conference that in no way
encroaches on the powers of the court.5 1 The Arizona Supreme Court
noted that Arizona's mediation panels are not empowered to render
a judgment against either party, and the court characterized panel
actions as merely "advisory. '52 Wisconsin's panel was upheld as
exercising quasi-judicial power only, with the reviewing court
afforded full opportunity to test the panel's conclusions.5 3 Thus, the
45. 282 Md. at 286, 385 A.2d at 64.
46. Id. The court cited authority from other states for this proposition. Cedar Rapids
Human Rights Comm'n v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., 222 N.W.2d
391, 396 (Iowa 1974); Underwood v. McDuffee, 15 Mich. 361, 368 (1867);
Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 733 (1949). See also
Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 505, 71 So. 2d 433, 439 (1954), in which the
Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the separation of powers argument in a
challenge to that state's workmen's compensation act, stating that "administrative agencies, although exercising quasi judicial powers.. . do not have the final
authority to decide and to render enforceable judgments."
47. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 45-46, 343 A.2d 521, 526 (1975) (quoting
Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 282, 101 A. 710, 715 (1917)).
48. 282 Md. at 287, 385 A.2d at 65.
49. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-2A-06(a) (Supp. 1979).
50. Id. § 3-2A-05(h).
51. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 110, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667 (1977).
52. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 582, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (1977).
53. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 522, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448-49
(1978).
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highest courts of Nebraska, Arizona, and Wisconsin concur with the
Court of Appeals of Maryland that the court system, which retains
the authority to render final decisions, remains the repository of
judicial power.
Only one jurisdiction, Illinois, is in disagreement. 4 The reason
for the difference lies in the Illinois definition of judicial power. The
Supreme Court of Illinois relied on a 1931 criminal case55 for the
proposition that "the application of principles of law is inherently a
judicial function." 56 Although the statement was lifted out of context
from a discussion of whether the judge or the jury should determine
questions of law, the Illinois court expanded the thought to declare
that the process of adjudication is an exercise of judicial power. Such
precedent is of dubious value in the separation of powers context. To
date, no state has accepted the Illinois definition of judicial power,
and Maryland has expressly rejected

it.5

IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Mediation panel statutes require only medical malpractice
claimants to submit their claims to pretrial review. This distinction
between medical malpractice plaintiffs and other tort plaintiffs
raises the question of whether such a classification violates the
58
equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions.
Although Maryland, like most states, classifies the tort action itself59
rather than the category of plaintiffs, application of the statute
results in a de facto classification of malpractice plaintiffs.60 The
mere existence of a legislatively created classification, however, does
not automatically violate equal protection rights.6 1 Equal protection
clauses only prohibit such a classification when it is shown to be

Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
People v. Bruner, 343 Il1. 146, 158, 175 N.E. 400, 405 (1931).
63 Ill. 2d at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 739.
The court of appeals found the argument "singularly unpersuasive." 282 Md. at
290, 385 A.2d at 67. Other courts have distinguished Wright, e.g., Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 582, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (1970), but only Maryland has
expressly repudiated the Illinois court's reasoning.
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states in relevant part: "No State shall
I . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Although article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not expressly
provide for equal protection of the laws, that article has been recognized as
embodying the concept of equal protection. Governor of Maryland v. Exxon
Corp., 279 Md. 410, 438 n.8, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 n.8 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117
(1978).
59. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (Supp. 1979) ("All claims, suits and
54.
55.
56.
57.

actions . . .against a health care provider").

60. See Note, The Massachusetts Medical Malpractice Statute: A Constitutional
Perspective, 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1289, 1296 (1977).
61. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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completely arbitrary,6 2 or when
the classification unduly impairs
63
another constitutional right.
Traditionally, courts have used a "two-tiered" analysis in
reviewing statutes challenged on equal protection grounds. 61 The
66
first tier, involving a fundamental rightr or suspect classification
requires that a compelling government interest justify the discriminatory classification. This is the "strict scrutiny" standard that,
according to one commentator, "has been 'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact."'6 7 The Court of Appeals of Maryland found no occasion to
apply strict scrutiny to the Maryland mediation plan inasmuch as it
found that the sole fundamental right involved in the case, the right
to a jury trial, 68 is not abridged.6 9 No court has yet applied strict
scrutiny in a similar case.70
62. See Lindsley v. National Carbonic Acid Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
63. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969). See generally Malpractice
Mediation, supra note 2, at 423-26.
64. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971) (suspect classification required state to justify action with compelling interest) with San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (strict scrutiny not
required; rational basis test applied).
65. According to Justice Black the term "fundamental right" includes most of the
specific guarantees of the first eight amendments to the United States
Constitution. Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 224-26 (1975).
Additionally, the category includes such rights as are "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). This latter definition includes the right of privacy, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the right to travel, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 338 (1972).
66. Traditional suspect classifications involve "immutable personal characteristics
or historical patterns of discrimination and political powerlessness." See State ex
rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 507, 261 N.W.2d 434, 442 (1978) (citing
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). Aside from such
inherently suspect distinctions as race, national origin, or alienage, four Justices
of the Supreme Court have held that discrimination based on sex is within the
ambit of suspect classifications. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(plurality opinion).
67. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]. Historically, statutes found to.
involve a fundamental interest or suspect classification almost invariably have
been found to lack "compelling" justification. "A rare exception is Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), upholding the forced evacuation of Japanese-

Americans from the West Coast." P. FREUND,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND

914-15 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FREUND].
68. It may be argued on the strength of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-77
(1971) (holding that access to courts in divorce action is fundamental) that access
to the courts is a fundamental right. The Supreme Court has, however, on at
least two occasions since Boddie rejected such an argument. United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (identifying the marital relationship, not right of
access, as the basis for the decision in Boddie); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973) (Boddie did not invalidate filing fee requirement for review of administrative denial of welfare benefits).
69. 282 Md. at 309-10, 385 A.2d at 77-78. See text accompanying notes 91-149 infra.
70. Courts which have considered the equal protection implications of mediation
statutes are in agreement that the rational basis test is a proper one in this
OTHER PROBLEMS
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The alternate tier of equal protection analysis involves minimal
judicial scrutiny. If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
classification is involved in the case, the state need only show that
the classification reasonably relates to the objective of the legislation.7 1 Under this "rational basis" test, courts are extremely
reluctant to set aside a legislative classification "if any state of facts
'
may reasonably be conceived to justify it." 72
The ultimate goal of mediation panels is to ameliorate the
73
malpractice insurance crisis - a legitimate public policy objective.
The hope is that an alternative to expensive litigation will reduce the
costs of defending malpractice suits, allowing a corresponding drop
in insurance rates. 74 Under the rational basis test, classifying
malpractice plaintiffs in a separate category from other tort
plaintiffs is permissible because it is reasonably related to the
legislative goal of remedying the specific problems of medical
75
malpractice insurance.
An intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny, the meansfocused test 76 was considered, but rejected by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. Under this test, the question is whether the classification

context. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, did not analyze the
question, rather it merely noted in a single sentence that the classification has a
rational basis and must be sustained. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 315, 390
N.Y.S.2d 122, 128 (1976). Other courts have gone to some length to supply the
rational basis themselves. See, e.g., Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 989
(Mass. 1977). The Florida Supreme Court faced the problem that while plaintiffs
were required to mediate, defendants were permitted the choice of participating
in the hearing or not participating. The Florida court found that this
arrangement violated equal protection, but resorted to statutory construction to
save the statute. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
71. See note 64 supra.
72. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). Historically, statutes subjected
to the rational basis test almost invariably have been sustained. P. FREUND,
supra note 67, at 915.
73. Health care is a matter of public interest, and it is within the police power of the
state to attempt to control health care costs. Cf. Blue Cross v. Franklin Square
Hosp., 277 Md. 93, 352 A.2d 798 (1976) (upholding the power of the Maryland
Health Services Cost Review Commission to regulate hospital rates).
74. The announced purpose of the Maryland Act is to reduce the cost of malpractice
claims, which would reduce the cost of liability insurance and help to stabilize
the insurance market. The Johnson trial court concluded that "This alone
justifies the Legislature's separate treatment of medical malpractice claims from
other tort liability claims." Johnson v. Attorney General, Daily Record, June 20,
1977 at 2, col. 7 (Baltimore City Ct., No. 111/197816-099191, filed June 6, 1977).
The settlement of malpractice cases serves at least three functions related to
the malpractice insurance problem. First, defense costs are saved. Secondly,
large verdicts rendered by sympathetic juries are forestalled. Finally, rapid
resolution of claims helps to eliminate the "long tail" problem faced by insurance
carriers. Malpractice Mediation. supra note 2, at 419 n.27.
75. Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. at 312, 385 A.2d at 79.
76. See generally Gunther, supra note 67. The Johnson court noted that Maryland
has not differentiated between the rational basis test and the "means-focused"
test. 282 Md. at 311, 385 A.2d at 78. The court observed that the "reasonable
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substantially furthers the legislative ends.77 The court inquires
whether a crisis does exist and whether the legislation in question
substantially alleviates that crisis. 78 This test was used in Idaho to

evaluate a statutory provision limiting recovery in malpractice
actions. The Idaho court remanded the case in order for the trial
court to determine
as a matter of fact whether a medical malpractice
79
crisis existed.

The Court of Common Pleas of Ohio in Graley v. Satayatham,80
used the means-focused test, without naming it, to strike down a
statute abrogating Ohio's collateral source rule." In Graley the Ohio
court, in an attempt to state the rational basis test, attributed the
basis" test is actually two tests. The legislative classification must bear some
rational relationship to its end or have some fair and substantial relationship to
that end. The first test is the traditional rational basis test, and is the test used

77.
78.
79.

80.
81.

by the court in upholding the Maryland mediation plan. The court applied the
second test in dictum, treating it as an intermediate-scrutiny test. That test is
satisfied "where the available evidence suggests the soundness of the theory."
282 Md. at 313, 385 A.2d at 79. The Johnson court has reawakened a controversy
that seemed to have ended in Maryland with Governor of Maryland v. Exxon
Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), affl'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). That case
ignored the "real and substantial relation" formulation in favor of a "reasonableness" test. Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual
Civil Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 299, 313 n.113 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Rees].
See Detroit Automotive Purchasing Servs. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 969-70 (D.
Md. 1978).
This confusing search for a middle level of review is unnecessary. Thus far,
intermediate scrutiny has been confined to classifications based on gender and
illegitimacy. See S. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & T. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 525
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NowAK & ROTUNDA]. Maryland's adoption of the
Equal Rights Amendment absolutely prohibits gender based classifications. See
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46. Thus, except for possible application in the
narrow area of classifications based upon illegitimacy, intermediate scrutiny is a
dead letter in Maryland.
See Gunther, supra note 67, at 20.
For a thorough discussion of the means-focused standard and its relationship to
legislation in the area of medical malpractice, see Redish, supra note 2, at
774-84.
The Idaho court stated that,
While we are as aware as any other member of the public of
assertions of growing problems in the medical malpractice insurance
field, the record here presents no factual basis for understanding the
nature and scope of the alleged medical malpractice crisis nationally or
in Idaho. It is thus impossible for this Court to assess the necessity for
this legislation and whether or not the limitations on medical
malpractice recovery set forth in the Act bear a fair and substantial
relationship to the asserted purpose of the Act.
Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 873-74, 555 P.2d 399, 413-14 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See also Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136
(N.D. 1978) (striking down North Dakota's limitation of damages statute on
equal protection grounds because the court found that no malpractice crisis
existed in North Dakota).
74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
Under the collateral source rule, the tort-feasor is not permitted to introduce
evidence at trial that plaintiff enjoys alternative sources of recompense for his
injury. The purpose of the rule is to allocate full liability for damages to the party
at fault. See Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation - A First
Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655, 669 (1976).
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following rule to McGowan v. Maryland:8 2 "[A] statutory classification cannot be tolerated unless a legitimate legislative objective is
furthered by the classification. ' 3 That is not an accurate statement
of the rule in McGowan, 4 but rather a fair approximation of the
means-focused test. The court applied the test, and8 5finally concluded
that "this legislation may be counterproductive."
The Court of Common Pleas compounded its error in Simon v.
Saint Elizabeth Medical Center.s6 In that case, relying exclusively
on Graley, the court struck down Ohio's mediation plan on equal
protection grounds. The Simon court observed that it could "add
nothing of importance to the equal protection analysis of the Graley
opinion,"87 and invalidated malpractice mediation because the
process grants benefits to malpractice defendants unavailable to
defendants in other tort cases.8 8 This reasoning prohibits the use of
different procedures for different tort actions - an impractical
solution to a complex problem. Long accepted variations in tort
actions, such as immunities for certain defendants and pleading and
proving special damages in certain libel cases would be discriminatory under such an approach.
Another objection to the means-focused test is that it requires
the judiciary to review the wisdom of legislative action. Courts have
constantly rejected the role of a "super legislature."8 9 Yet, in
applying the test, a court is required to determine first, whether the
legislative action was necessary at all, and if it was, whether the
chosen action was the proper one.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to indulge in judicial
second-guessing, stating "it is inappropriate for a court to preclude
the legislature from attempting to resolve a problem in a particular
manner simply because the intended results cannot be definitively
demonstrated in advance." 9 This approach is in keeping with the
proper function of the judiciary in its role as reviewer of legislative
enactments.

366 U.S. 420 (1961).
74 Ohio Op. 2d at 319, 343 N.E.2d at 836.
See text accompanying note 72 supra.
74 Ohio Op. 2d at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 838.
3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 NE.2d 903 (1976).
Id. at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906.
Id.
See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976), wherein the Supreme
Court of the United States stated that "Ithe judiciary may not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
along suspect lines."
90. 282 Md. at 313, 385 A.2d 57 at 79. The court stated, in dicta, however, that even if
the means-scrutiny test were applied, the result would be no different because
there is no evidence to show that the chosen means are unlikely to accomplish
the legislative goal. Id. at 312-13, 385 A.2d at 79-80.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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V. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution,
which guarantees the right to jury trial in civil cases, has not been
held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 91
Nearly all state constitutions, however, provide that a jury trial is
93
guaranteed in civil cases. 92 Because medical malpractice is a tort,
94
the plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury. Mandatory mediation of
malpractice cases has been challenged as infringing upon two
aspects of this right: (1) the right to present the case before a jury,
viz. the due process right of access, and (2) the right to have the jury
determine the facts in controversy.
A. Right of Access
The first attack is grounded upon the theory that mediation of
claims involves such substantial expense and delay that a plaintiffs
right of access to the courts is abridged. 95 The right of access is
guaranteed in Maryland by article nineteen of the Declaration of
Rights.9 6 The "law of the land" provision in article nineteen

91. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,
169 n.4 (1973); cf. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (prior

to adoption of the 14th amendment incorporation doctrine).
92. The only exceptions are Louisiana and Colorado.
93. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 162-66 (4th ed. 1971).
94. The question of whether a party is entitled to a jury trial has often been resolved
by use of a historical test: if a jury trial was available to a similar claimant at the
time that the Constitution was adopted, the jury trial right is secured as
"inviolate," and the parties must be afforded a trial by jury. E.g., Houston v.
Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 20, 215 A.2d 192, 198 (1965).
Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891 (1898). The
historical test does not require that the state refrain from adding qualifications
to the right, but has been specifically limited to an evaluation of the availability
of a jury trial. See Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596
(1897). It is important to note, however, that in the federal court system the jury
trial question is no longer resolved by simple application of the historical test.
See Ross v. Bernhardt, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
95. Justice England of the Florida Supreme Court, while concurring in the
validation of Florida's mediation plan, was troubled "that persons who seek to
bring malpractice lawsuits must be put to the expense of two full trials of their
claim." Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977). Justice England noted further, however, that "[a] disparity of
resources has always been an imbalance in litigation which the courts are
relatively powerless to adjust." Id. at 808.
96. Article 19 provides as follows:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property,
ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to
have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the Law of the land.
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guarantees the same due process 9 7of law as the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The threshold question in due process analysis is whether state
action has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property. In the
context of mediation panels, the plaintiff must establish a liberty or
property interest in right of access to the courts and a deprivation of
that interest. In Maryland, a plaintiff is guaranteed "remedy by the
course of the [flaw of the land."98 That law is not a solidified body of
law. "Rather it is a 'system' where sometimes evolutionary,
sometimes revolutionary changes are made to meet changing
conditions and circumstances." 99 A plaintiff may have a liberty or
property interest in the system as a whole, but not in any particular
rule. The rules may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of
the legislature. 10° Thus, although a plaintiff may demand that his
rights be determined by the "law of the land," he may not block
changes in that law by claiming an "interest" in the status quo.
Because a plaintiff has no liberty or property interest in the
right of access to the courts, the protections of article nineteen of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights are not triggered. Nonetheless, in
dictum, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Attorney General v.
Johnson'01 applied substantive due process analysis to the facts.
Substantive due process requires that the laws passed by the state2
legislature bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate objective10
This "ends-means" test is satisfied by the same rational basis test
required by equal protection analysis. 0 3 Thus, even if a plaintiff can
establish deprivation of a vested liberty or property interest, so long
as a court finds that the additional expense and delay is not
unreasonable in relation to a legitimate legislative goal, substantive
due process is satisfied. 0 4 Other jurisdictions that have considered
97. In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 187, 133 A.2d 441, 447 (1957). In construing article 19,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the decisions of the Supreme
Court are practically direct authorities. Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard and
Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. Md.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982
(1968); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977),
aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).

98.

MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art.

19.

99. Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.
Md.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
100. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
101. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
102. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 410. If a fundamental right is involved,
however, the state must show a compelling government interest. Id. In essence,
the two-tiered test associated with equal protection analysis has been transplanted into the area of due process. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973)
(Rhenquist, J., dissenting). For a thorough treatment of substantive due process,
see Preston & Mehiman, The Due Process Clause As A Limitation On The Reach
Of State Legislation:An HistoricalAnd Analytical Examination Of Substantive
Due Process, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1978). For a discussion of the due process test
in Maryland, see Rees, supra note 76, at 313 n.114.
103. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 410.
104. See 282 Md. at 299, 385 A.2d at 71.
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the right of access question agree with Maryland that the restriction
is reasonable in light of the legitimate
goal of reducing the cost of
10 5
medical malpractice insurance.
It is sometimes argued that mediation panel statutes abolish a
common law right without providing a reasonable substitute for that
right thereby violating due process. 10 6 The idea that due process
requires a reasonable substitute or quid pro quo apparently
10 7
originated from dictum in New York Central Railroad v. White.
The Court of Appeals of New York has indicated, however, that it
seriously questions whether the quid pro quo test is any test at all.108
Despite doubts about the validity of quid pro quo as applied to
whether mediation panels unconstitutionally abridge a litigant's
access to courts, several courts have accepted the argument that
legislation limiting the amount of recoverable damages in malpractice actions violates due process. These courts reason that such
legislation fails to provide a substitute for the right to recover
damages above a specified limit.10 9 In considering the right of access
question, the trial court in Johnson relied partly on the quid pro quo
test. 110 The court of appeals, however, ignored the test completely,
which indicates that quid pro quo is probably of little importance in
Maryland. Other courts have held that malpractice mediation does
not eliminate any substantive rights, but merely alters the procedure
105. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444
(1978). The latest jurisdiction to consider the right of access question disagrees
with Maryland, however. The Supreme Court of Missouri declared that state's
mediation plan unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated a litigant's right
to seek immediate redress in the courts. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial
Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979). Chief Justice Morgan,
however, in a strong dissent, noted that the procedure does not interfere with the
ultimate jury determination of the issues. The Chief Justice concluded that "the
condition is minimal and reasonable in light of the legislation's purpose of
minimizing the medical [mallpractice crisis." Id. at 115.
106. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 868-69, 555 P.2d 399,
408-09 (1976).
107. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). "[lIt perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish
all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting
up something adequate in their stead." Id. at 201.
108. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 56, 340 N.E.2d 444, 453, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 14
(1975).
109. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.
2d 313, 328, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742
(1976); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 170, 355
N.E.2d 903, 910 (1976).
110. The trial court compared the Maryland plan to workmen's compensation law.
Workmen's compensation abrogated the common law concept of fault for
employees' injuries but provided a substitute remedy allowing recovery according
to a statutory schedule. At least one court has identified this act of substitution
as the justification for upholding workmen's compensation. Department of
Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand and Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 227, 334
A.2d 514, 524-25 (1975). The Johnson trial court noted that "no such quid pro quo
is found in the Act, and this factor is not without significance." Johnson v.
Attorney General, Daily Record, June 20, 1977, at 2, col. 5 (Baltimore City Ct.,
No. 111/197816-099191, filed June 6, 1977).
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for enforcing those rights.11 One court found the requisite quid pro
quo in lowered costs to the plaintiff as a consumer of medical
services.1 12 In summary, the quid pro quo test is of little analytical
value as a measure of medical mediation's satisfaction of due
process standards, either because it is not a test at all, or because the
the requirements of the test are satisfied. No court has used quid pro
quo to invalidate mediation legislation, and because of lack of
certainty about the test, it is not likely that any court will do so.
B.

The Jury as Fact Finder

In several states, mediation panels have been challenged on the
ground that admissibility of the panel's decision at a later trial de
novo deprives the jury of its protected function as finder of fact. The
gravamen of the argument is that the jury will be so influenced by
the finding of the mediation panel that it will not render its own
verdict. An early trial court decision accepted this reasoning and
held that Ohio's mediation panel statute unconstitutionally abridged
the right to jury trial.' 13 The court reasoned that admission of the
panel decision "substantially reduces a party's ability to prove his
-case, because that party must persuade a jury that the decision of
the arbitrators was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished in view
of the added weight which juries have traditionally accorded the
testimony of experts."' 4 The court further insisted that the statute
put "strings" on the jury trial right, "making it a far less effective
right than would otherwise be the case."' 115
A New York trial court, however, took an equally firm stand in
116
support of the constitutionality of admitting the panel's finding.
The court praised the jury system for its ability to remain objective:
"Historically, jurors for the most part have proven their independence. They guard their roles with unique jealousy. They accept with
obvious pride the admonitions of the trial court that they are the
'sole judges of the facts.' "117 As appellate courts began to consider
the question, the two trial court decisions inevitably came into
conflict. Without exception, the reasoning of the New York court,
18
extolling the independence of jury decisions, has prevailed.
111. See, e.g., Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Mass. 1977).
112. Id. But see Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 170, 355
N.E.2d 903, 910 (1976) (rejecting the societal quid pro quo argument that some
must give up their rights so that all may receive cheaper medical care).
113. Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903
(1976).
114. Id. at 168, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
115. Id.
116. Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1976).
117. Id. at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
118. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 581, 570 P.2d 744, 749 (1977)
("Moreover, we believe, as did the court in Halpern v. Gozan. . . that if the trial
court properly instructs the jury they will perform their role as the exclusive
finder of fact.").
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The conflict and resulting trend are particularly noteworthy in
regard to Maryland, because Maryland is the only state that cloaks
the finding of the mediation panel with a presumption of correctness. 119 Thus, the panel's finding carries more weight in Maryland
and seems to intrude further into the province of the jury than in
any other state. In upholding similar statutes, other courts have
relied on the fact that the panel finding is accorded no particular
weight. The Maryland statute, however, must be supported on other
grounds.
The court of appeals in Attorney General v. Johnson,120 found
that the General Assembly of Maryland had merely established a
rebuttable presumption. "It cuts off no defense, interposes no
obstacles to a full contestation of all the issues, and takes no
question of fact from either court or jury."1 2 1 In most states the
Maryland style presumption would rest lightly on the shoulders of
the party against whom it weighs. If neither party presents evidence
at the trial de novo, a directed verdict should issue for the party in
whose favor the presumption lies. 122 If, however, his opponent can
muster sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict, the presumption is rebutted. Thus, in most jurisdictions, either party's burden to
rebut is subsumed under his far greater burden to prove his case in
chief. No additional burden would be imposed by the presumption of
correctness. Although the presumption is sufficient to sustain the
burden of proof, it is defeated by the introduction of rebutting
testimony. This is the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions
123
accepted by nearly all jurisdictions.
In Maryland, however, "the cases indicate a presumption-bypresumption approach with an emphasis on according presumptions
' 24
a greater procedural potency than the bursting bubble theory."'
The Maryland courts have doncluded that some presumptions are
supported by underlying values that should not be banished upon
the appearance of slight evidence. 125 In some cases, Maryland courts
require that the presumption be rebutted by a preponderance of the

119. See note 19 supra.
120. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978).
121. 282 Md. 274, 294-95, 385 A.2d 57, 69 (quoting Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236
U.S. 412, 430 (1915)). In Meeker, the court held that a provision permitting the
introduction of the prior findings and order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein did not violate
the right to trial by jury. See also Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920)
(admission of auditor's report as prima facie evidence does not violate right to
jury trial).

122. See C.

MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENcE
MCCORMICK].

821 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as

123. Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966).
124. Comment, Presumptions in Civil Cases: Procedural Effects Under Maryland
Law In State and FederalForums, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 301, 312 (1976) thereinafter
cited as Presumptions].

125. Id. at 315.
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evidence.' 2 6 In other cases, rebuttal of the presumption may require
less than a preponderance. 127 In order to determine the weight to be
accorded a presumption, the court examines the underlying policy
for the presumption. The more important the reason for the
presumption, the more likely that a preponderance of the evidence
s
will be required to overturn it.12

In Grier v. Rosenberg,129 the case that fashioned the current
Maryland rule, the presumption was based both upon substantial
public policy'

30

and upon the inferential probative value of the

126. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 222, 210 A.2d 743, 748 (1965).
127. See Presumptions,supra note 124, at 314, for a discussion of the now-abolished
presumption of death that arose from an unexplained absence of seven years.
The author suggests that the presumption of death was rebuttable by less than a
preponderance of the evidence.
128. See Presumptions, supra note 124, at 308-15.
129. 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957). Plaintiff Grier alleged personal injury caused
by the sudden stop of a Baltimore City transit bus on which she was a passenger.
The bus had stopped quickly to avoid a collision with a car owned by defendant
Rosenberg. The car did not stop after the near collision, but its license number
was noted by the bus driver. Rosenberg conceded that in cases of this kind proof
of ownership of the car gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the car was. in
fact, operated by the owner or his agent, servant, or employee. Rosenberg
contended, however, that the presumption was rebutted by his testimony that he
could not recall any activity that would have taken him near the scene of the
injury. Rosenberg stated that someone from his office might have driven his car
on the day of the injury, but that inquiries among his employees had not
produced anyone who remembered the incident. The court of appeals held that
although Rosenberg had given sufficient evidence to present a jury question, and
thus avoid a directed verdict, the presumption did not disappear from the case.
213 Md. at 255, 131 A.2d at 740. In most jurisdictions the bubble would have
burst, and the presumption would not have gone to the jury. In Maryland,
however, a different rule is followed:
In cases of this nature, after the plaintiff has offered proof of the
ownership of the automobile in the defendant, if the defendant does not
offer any evidence on the issue of agency, the Court should instruct the
jury that if they find that as a fact that the defendant owned the car,
they must find he is responsible for the negligence (if any) of the driver.
If the defendant does present evidence to show that the alleged driver
was engaged on business or a purpose of his own, it may be so slight
that the Court will rule it is insufficient to be considered by the jury in
rebuttal of the presumption, in which case the Court should grant the
same instruction it would have granted if the defendant had offered no
evidence on the issue. The evidence may be so conclusive that it shifts
the burden or duty of going forward with evidence back to the plaintiff,
in which event the defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict, if
the plaintiff does not produce evidence in reply, unless there is already
evidence in the case tending to contradict defendant's evidence ....
The evidence, however, may fall between the two categories mentioned
above, in which event the issue of agency should be submitted to the
jury.
213 Md. at 254-55, 131 A.2d at 740.
130. The presumption rests on defendant's superior access to the evidence and on the
social policy of widening the responsibility for owners of motor vehicles.
MCCORMICK, supra note 122, at 822.
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underlying set of facts.' 3 ' Therefore, the Grier court determined that
a preponderance of the evidence was required to rebut that
presumption. The mediation panel presumption, on the other hand,
is based upon a desire to save time and money. There is no vital
public policy requiring that the presumption be accorded exceptional
significance. Therefore, it is possible that in applying the presumption the judge need only determine whether credible evidence has
been introduced in rebuttal sufficient to support a finding contrary
to the presumed fact.
It is more probable, however, that rebuttal of the presumption of
correctness requires more than mere credible evidence. The Maryland court noted that the presumption is precisely the same as that
found in Maryland's Workmen's Compensation Act. 132 Under
Maryland law, the finding of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission is "prima facie correct." 133 That provision puts the
burden of proof on the party taking the appeal, whether he be
plaintiff or defendant. 3 4 If the plaintiff is the party appealing he
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision of
the Commission was incorrect. When the defendant loses before the
Commission and appeals, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant. 135 Under workmen's compensation law, the provision
placing the burden of proof on the appellant means only that he
must prove in the trial court what he asserts. 13 6 The presumption of
correctness, because it has the same effect as the workmen's
compensation provision just discussed, requires the plaintiff at the
trial de novo to persuade the court or jury by a preponderance of the
evidence that the decision of the mediation panel was incorrect. Only
if the mind of the trier of fact is in equipoise on the evidence in the
record will the presumption be sufficient to tip the scales in favor of
37
the party who prevailed at the mediation hearing.1
No matter what the effect of the presumption at the trial de novo,
the jury remains the final arbiter of the issues raised, and its
decision, based upon consideration of all the evidence, prevails. The
New York trial court in Halpern v. Gozan,13 8 and every appellate
court to consider the question since then have expressed confidence
in the jury's ability to remain unaffected by "suggestion, device, or
131. See Presumptions, supra note 124, at 314.

132. 282 Md. at 293, 385 A.2d at 68.
133. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(c) (1979).
134. Stewart & Co. v. Howell, 136 Md. 423, 434, 110 A. 899, 902 (1920).

135. Id.
136. Williams Constr. Co. v. Bohlen, 189 Md. 576, 580, 56 A.2d 694, 696 (1948). The

party appealing may rely on the same evidence presented before the Commis-

sion, but must convince the trier of fact that the Commission incorrectly decided
the facts, drew improper inferences from the facts, or misconstrued the law
applicable to the facts. Id.
137. 282 Md. at 293, 385 A.2d at 68.
138. 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1976).
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artifice." 139 Careful jury instruction should prevent any intrusion on
the parties' right to have the jury make an independent determina140
tion of the facts.
While the regulation of access to the courts under the mediation
plan may not amount to deprivation of due process, that regulation
does affect the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article five of the
Declaration of Rights. 14 1 That the jury trial right may be subject to
regulation has been long established in Maryland. 14 2 The essential
requirement is that a jury trial be allowed before the final
decision. 143 Only if the legislature made the findings of the
mediation panel final and binding would the jury trial right be
144
directly abridged.
A closer question is whether the mediation requirement
constitutes an onerous condition, restriction, or regulation that
makes the jury trial right "practically unavailable.' ' 14 5 The Florida
Supreme Court responded that while mandatory compliance with the
malpractice mediation procedure is at the "outer limits of constitu-

139. Id. at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
140. For a discussion of jury instructions on presumptions that deviate from the
bursting bubble approach, see MCCORMICK, supra note 122, at 824-26.

141. The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in pertinent part for the right to a
jury trial as follows:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and
to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth
day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other
circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the
Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the
first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may
have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or
repeal by, the Legislature of this State.
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS. art. 5.

142. Steuart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500, 512 (1855).
143. Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 625, 40 A. 890, 891 (1898).
144. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 289-90, 385 A.2d 57, 66, appeal
dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978).
145. Id. at 303, 385 A.2d at 74. The "practically unavailable" standard originated in
In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the
right to jury trial is lost only when the statute closes the courts to litigants and
makes the decision of the arbitrators the final determination of the parties'
dispute. Therefore, there is no denial of the right of trial by jury if the statute
preserves that right to each of the parties by the allowance of an appeal from the
decision of the arbitrators or other tribunal. "The only purpose of the
constitutional provision is to secure the right of trial by jury before rights of
person or property are finally determined. [emphasis in original]. All that is
required is that the right of appeal for the purpose of presenting the issue to a
jury must not be burdened by the imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or
regulations which would make the right practically unavailable." Id. at 231, 112
A.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
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tional tolerance,' ' 146 it is not such a burden, and the Florida plan was
held constitutional. Although the Maryland court's statement that
"the court proceeding with its jury trial is subjected to no regulation
or burden of any kind as a precondition to its utilization' 1 47 is
somewhat questionable, the point is that burdens and regulations
may be affixed to the right of trial by jury 148 so long as the right is
not made practically unavailable. In light of the fact that the right
to jury trial may be delayed or made more expensive, 149 it must be
recognized that the "practically unavailable" standard requires a
heavier burden than malpractice mediation imposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
A sharp rise in malpractice insurance premiums briefly
highlighted the area of medical malpractice. Although developments
in that area will likely continue, the volume of legislative activity
has diminished considerably. The dozens of plans, programs, and
solutions to the malpractice insurance problem have come under
constitutional examination. Nearly all have survived judicial
scrutiny. The basic reason lies in the tradition of judicial deference
to legislative wisdom.
Of the entire range of extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms, mediation panels hold the most promise. The rights of both
parties are preserved for trial, if need be, but a mediation plan
provides a powerful incentive to settlement.
Considering the onslought of increasingly complex litigation
overburdening the court system, further legislative action is almost a
certainty. If mediation panels prove to be effective in the area of
medical malpractice law, it is possible that state legislatures will
apply such solutions to other areas of the law as well, perhaps
beginning with various personal injury torts. Mediation can be both
effective and impervious to constitutional attack if the legislature
follows certain simple rules in drafting. The most important
consideration concerns the decision of the mediation panel itself.
The object is to derive maximum impact from the decision, while
leaving unabridged the right to jury trial and observing the doctrine
of separation of powers. To this end, any statute must guarantee a
trial de novo following mediation.
Attorney General v. Johnson150 upholds the admissibility of the
panel's decision as evidence at trial and permits the decision to be

146. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976).

147. 282 Md. at 303, 385 A.2d at 74.
148. Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 625, 40 A. 890, 891 (1898).
149. Id.
150. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978).
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cloaked with a presumption of correctness. Given the advantages of
these provisions, there is little doubt that mediation could be made
an effective alternative to formal courtroom proceedings.1 5 1 Whether
of
mediation plans will prove adequate in the face of the burdens
152
administrative practicality, however, awaits the test of time.
Matthew Zimmerman

151. Under the doctrine laid down in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has held that
suits arising under diversity jurisdiction that are otherwise covered by the Act
must be mediated prior to the filing of a complaint in the District Court. Davison
v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778. 779-80 (D. Md. 1978); accord
Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Florida
law). Thus, the Maryland presumption of the correctness of the mediation panel
decision will likely be applied in the federal courts as "a presumption respecting
a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision." FED. R. EvID. 302. See generally Maryland v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964).
152. Not all plans have proved a resounding success in handling the practicalities of
administration. Indeed, the Pennsylvania plan has been attacked unsuccessfully
on such grounds, prompting the Third Circuit to observe:
Appellants forcefully argue that plaintiffs who have been injured
because of medical malpractice have effectively been denied an
opportunity to present their cases to a judge and jury. A record that
discloses only nine arbitration hearings out of 2,466 claims does not
describe a state arbitration system that works exceptionally well,
moderately well, or even modestly well. Rather, it describes a system
that, though theoretically sound, is actually a resounding flop.
Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1979).

